THE HOW

  How De Jure  (GOD'S) Governments are Transformed into Corrupt (Satanic) De- Facto Governments    

 

“Governments never do anything by accident; if government does something you can bet it was carefully planned.”

[Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States]

 

Legal definition of Franchise: Franchise a special privilege conferred by government on individual or corporation, and which does not belong to citizens of country generally of common right Elliott v city Eugene, 135 Or, 108, 295 P 358, 360 

  Government  Franchise Enslavement 809 pages:

 Franchises and/or their abuse are the main method by which:

1. De jure governments are transformed into corrupted de facto governments.

2. The requirement for consent of the governed is systematically eliminated.

3. The equal protection that is the foundation of the Constitution is replaced with inequality, privilege, hypocrisy, and partiality in which the government is a parens patriae (parent) and possesses an unconstitutional “title of nobility” in relation to those it is supposed to be serving and protecting.

4. The separation of powers between the states and federal government are eliminated.

5. The separation between what is “public” and what is “private” is destroyed. Everything becomes PUBLIC and is owned by the “collective”. There is no private property and what you think is ABSOLUTE ownership of PRIVATE property is really just equitable title and QUALIFIED ownership of PUBLIC property.

6. Constitutional rights attaching to the land you stand on are replaced with statutory privileges created through your right to contract and your “status” under a franchise agreement.

7 Adapted from: Government  Franchise Enslavement 809 pages: Section 14

“You shall make no covenant [contract or franchise] with them [foreigners, pagans], nor with their [pagan government] gods [laws or judges]. They shall not dwell in your land [and you shall not dwell in theirs by becoming a “resident” or domiciliary in the process of contracting with them], lest they make you sin against Me [God]. For if you serve their [government] gods [under contract or agreement or franchise], it will surely be a snare to you.”[Exodus 23:32-33, Bible, NKJV] 6

7. Your legal identity is “laundered”, and kidnapped or transported to a foreign jurisdiction, the District of Criminals, and which is not protected by the Constitution. This is usually done by compulsion or duress, as in the case of compelled licensing.

“For the upright will dwell in the land,

And the blameless will remain in it;

But the wicked will be cut off from the earth,

And the unfaithful will be uprooted from it.”

[Prov. 2:21-22, Bible, NKJV] 14

8. The protections of the Constitution for your rights are eliminated.

9. Rights are transformed into privileges.

10. Republics based on individual rights are transformed into socialist democracies based on collective rights and individual privileges.

11. The status of “citizen, resident, or inhabitant” is devolved into nothing but an “employee” or “officer” of a corporation. “Nobody in America can tell you how long you can wear your hair unless of course they are your boss” Annon

12. Constitutional courts are transformed into franchise courts.

13. Conflicts of interest are introduced into the legal and court systems that perpetuate a further expansion of the de facto system.

14. Socialism is introduced into a republican form of government.

15. The sovereignty of people in the states of the Union are destroyed.

The gravely injurious effects of participating in government franchises include the following.

1. Those who participate become domiciliaries of the federal zone, “U.S. persons”, and “resident aliens” in respect to the federal government.

2. Those who participate become “trustees” of the “public trust” and “public officers” of the federal government and suffer great legal disability as a consequence:

 

“As expressed otherwise, the powers delegated to a public officer are held in trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the officer. 8Furthermore, the view has been expressed that all public officers, within whatever branch and whatever level of government, and whatever be their private vocations, are trustees of the people, and accordingly labor under every disability and prohibition imposed by law upon trustees relative to the making of personal financial gain from a discharge of their trusts. That is, a public officer occupies a fiduciary relationship to the political entity on whose behalf he or she serves. 10 and owes a fiduciary duty to the public.  It has been said that the fiduciary responsibilities of a public officer cannot be less than those of a private individual.

Furthermore, it has been stated that any enterprise undertaken by the public official which tends to weaken public confidence and undermine the sense of security for individual rights is against public policy.

8 State ex rel. Nagle v. Sullivan, 98 Mont. 425, 40 P.2d. 995, 99 A.L.R. 321; Jersey City v. Hague, 18 N.J. 584, 115 A.2d. 8.

9 Georgia Dep’t of Human Resources v. Sistrunk, 249 Ga. 543, 291 S.E.2d. 524. A public official is held in public trust. Madlener v. Finley (1st Dist) 161 Ill.App.3d. 796, 113 Ill.Dec. 712, 515 N.E.2d. 697, app gr 117 Ill.Dec. 226, 520 N.E.2d. 387 and revd on other grounds 128 Ill.2d. 147, 131 Ill.Dec. 145, 538 N.E.2d. 520.

10 Chicago Park Dist. v. Kenroy, Inc., 78 Ill.2d. 555, 37 Ill.Dec. 291, 402 N.E.2d. 181, appeal after remand (1st Dist) 107 Ill.App.3d. 222, 63 Ill.Dec. 134, 437 N.E.2d. 783.

11 United States v. Holzer (CA7 Ill) 816 F.2d. 304 and vacated, remanded on other grounds 484 U.S. 807, 98 L.Ed.2d. 18, 108 S.Ct. 53, on remand (CA7 Ill) 840 F.2d. 1343, cert den 486 U.S. 1035, 100 L.Ed.2d. 608, 108 S.Ct. 2022 and (criticized on other grounds by United States v. Osser (CA3 Pa), 864 F.2d. 1056) and (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v. Little (CA5 Miss) 889 F.2d. 1367) and (among conflicting authorities on other grounds noted in United States v. Boylan (CA1 Mass) 898 F.2d. 230, 29 Fed.Rules.Evid.Serv. 1223).

12 Chicago ex rel. Cohen v. Keane, 64 Ill.2d. 559, 2 Ill.Dec. 285, 357 N.E.2d. 452, later proceeding (1st Dist) 105 Ill.App.3d. 298, 61 Ill.Dec. 172, 434 N.E.2d. 325.

13 Indiana State Ethics Comm’n v. Nelson (Ind App) 656 N.E.2d. 1172, reh gr (Ind App) 659 N.E.2d. 260, reh den (Jan 24, 1996) and transfer den (May 28, 1996).[63C American Jurisprudence 2d., Public Officers and Employees, §247 (1999)] 1

3. Those who participate are stripped of ALL of their constitutional rights and waive their Constitutional right not to be subjected to penalties and other “bills of attainder” administered by the Executive Branch without court trials. They then must function the degrading treatment of filling the role of a federal “public employee” subject to the supervision of their servants in the government.

“The restrictions that the Constitution places upon the government in its capacity as lawmaker, i.e., as the regulator of private conduct, are not the same as the restrictions that it places upon the government in its capacity as employer. We have recognized this in many contexts, with respect to many different constitutional guarantees. Private citizens perhaps cannot be prevented from wearing long hair, but policemen can. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976). Private citizens cannot have their property searched without probable cause, but in many circumstances government employees can. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987) (plurality opinion); id., at 732 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). Private citizens cannot be punished for refusing to provide the government information that may incriminate them, but government employees can be dismissed when the incriminating information that they refuse to provide relates to the performance of their job. Gardner v. Broderick, [497 U.S. 62, 95] 392 U.S. 273, 277 -278 (1968). With regard to freedom of speech in particular: Private citizens cannot be punished for speech of merely private concern, but government employees can be fired for that reason. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). Private citizens cannot be punished for partisan political activity, but federal and state employees can be dismissed and otherwise punished for that reason. Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 101 (1947); Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 556 (1973); 19

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 616 -617 (1973).” 20

[Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990)] 21

4. Those who participate may lawfully be deprived of equal protection of the law, which is the foundation of the U.S. Constitution. This deprivation of equal protection can lawfully become a provision of the franchise agreement.

5. Those who participate can lawfully be deprived of remedy for abuses in federal courts. 

"These general rules are well settled: (1) That the United States, when it creates rights in individuals against itself [a "public right", which is a euphemism for a "franchise" to help the court disguise the nature of the transaction], is under no obligation to provide a remedy through the courts. United States ex rel. Dunlap v.

Black, 128 U.S. 40, 9 Sup.Ct. 12, 32 L.Ed. 354; Ex parte Atocha, 17 Wall. 439, 21 L.Ed. 696; Gordon v. United States, 7 Wall. 188, 195, 19 L.Ed. 35; De Groot v. United States, 5 Wall. 419, 431, 433, 18 L.Ed. 700; Comegys v. Vasse, 1 Pet. 193, 212, 7 L.Ed. 108. (2) That where a statute creates a right and provides a special remedy, that remedy is exclusive. Wilder Manufacturing Co. v. Corn Products Co., 236 U.S. 165, 174, 175, 35 Sup.Ct. 398, 59 L.Ed. 520, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 118; Arnson v. Murphy, 109 U.S. 238, 3 Sup.Ct. 184, 27 L.Ed. 920; Barnet v. National Bank, 98 U.S. 555, 558, 25 L.Ed. 212; Farmers' & Mechanics' National Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29,  L.Ed. 196. Still the fact that the right and the remedy are thus intertwined might not, if the provision stood alone, require us to hold that the remedy expressly given excludes a right of review by the Court of Claims, where the decision of the special tribunal involved no disputed question of fact and the denial of compensation was rested wholly upon the construction of the act. See Medbury v. United States, 173 U.S. 492, 198, 19 Sup.Ct. 503,  L.Ed. 779; Parish v. MacVeagh, 214 U.S. 124, 29 Sup.Ct. 556, 53 L.Ed. 936; McLean v. United States, 226 U.S. 374, 33 Sup.Ct. 122, 57 L.Ed. 260; United States v. Laughlin (No. 200), 249 U.S. 440, 39 Sup.Ct. 340, 63 3L.Ed. 696, decided April 14, 1919.

[U.S. v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328, 39 S.Ct. 464 (1919) ] 41

6. Those who participate can be directed which federal courts they may litigate in and can lawfully be deprived of a Constitutional Article III judge or Article III court and forced to seek remedy ONLY in an Article I or Article IV legislative or administrative tribunal within the Legislative rather than Judicial branch of the government.

Although Crowell and Raddatz do not explicitly distinguish between rights created by Congress and other rights, such a distinction underlies in part Crowell's and Raddatz' recognition of a critical difference between rights created by federal statute and rights recognized by the Constitution. Moreover, such a distinction seems to us to be necessary in light of the delicate accommodations required by the principle of separation of powers reflected in Art. III. The constitutional system of checks and balances is designed to guard against “encroachment or aggrandizement” by Congress at the expense of the other branches of government. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S., at 122, 96 S.Ct., at 683. But when Congress creates a statutory right [a “privilege” in this case, such as a “trade or business”], it clearly has the discretion, in defining that right, to create presumptions, or assign burdens of proof, or prescribe remedies; it may also provide that persons seeking to vindicate that right must do so before particularized tribunals created to perform the specialized adjudicative tasks related to that right.FN35 Such provisions do, in a sense, affect the exercise of judicial power, but they are also incidental to Congress' power to define the right that it has created. No comparable justification exists, however, when the right being adjudicated is not of congressional creation. In such a situation, substantial inroads into functions that have traditionally been performed by the Judiciary cannot be characterized merely as incidental extensions of Congress' power to define rights that it has created. Rather, such inroads suggest unwarranted encroachments upon the judicial power of the United States, which our Constitution reserves for Art. III courts. 60

[Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. at 83-84, 102 S.Ct. 2858 (1983)] 61

Since the founding of our country, franchises have systematically been employed in every area of government to transform a government based on equal protection into a for-profit private corporation